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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a foreignpolicy tool. Government officials use sporting boycotts, a nontraditional form of a sanction, in
contemporary politics. Using the Carter administration’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics
as a case study, this thesis elucidates why President Carter chose to implement a sporting
boycott, and whether the boycott was effective in achieving its intended goals. President Carter
chose to boycott the Olympics because of the failure of past sanctions to force the Soviet Union
from Afghanistan, the influence of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the
potential to challenge the Soviet Union’s reputation in a very public setting. The boycott did not
force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; however, it was an effective symbolic tool aimed to
embarrass the Soviet Union.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter
announced that the United States would boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. President
Carter’s use of an Olympic boycott to exercise foreign policy. This occurrence showcases an
intersection between sports and foreign policy that elicits several questions about the Carter
administration’s decision-making process and what factors shaped their decisions. What was the
Carter administration’s chief objective? Who participated in the decision-making process? What
options were available to the Carter administration? Why impose a boycott over other options?
In turn, this knowledge will provide further leverage on the larger topic of sanctions in foreignpolicy.
In the United States and many other countries, sports and politics are intertwined.
Athletes and government officials in domestic and international settings often make political
overtures and carry out demonstrations. The president routinely invites various championship
teams, both collegiate and professional, to the White House. Athletes often use sporting events as
a platform to protest. For example, Colin Kaepernick knelt during the national anthem
proceeding the National Football League’s games to raise awareness of police brutality.1 In the
international sports arena, the connection between politics and sports is even more apparent. For
example, some journalists claim the joint participation of North and South Korea in the 2018
Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as a signal of future peace.2 Russia gained notoriety at this same
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Olympics because some of its athletes were accused of using prohibited drugs, and the Russian
government allegedly played a role in this scandal.3 Likewise, in the 1980s during the Apartheid
era, multiple nations participated in a sporting boycott against South Africa.4 In the 1970s the
Chinese government used “ping-pong diplomacy” to signal its global opening economically and
diplomatically.5 Although sports are nominally apolitical, sports and politics are often connected.
The Olympic Games provide a prime example of a forum where international sports and
politics are intertwined. Although the Olympics are supposed to be apolitical, some of the most
notable political protests and demonstrations in history have occurred during the Olympics. For
example, when African American Jesse Owens defeated Nazi Germany’s runner during the 1936
Berlin Olympics, commentators touted the win as a victory over Germany’s Aryan beliefs.6
During the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, American medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos
raised their fists on the Olympic podium to express their discontent with race relations in the
United States.7 Olympic hosts often use the Games as a podium for spreading propaganda and
demonstrating national pride. Millions of citizens across the globe watch the Olympic Games.
Consequently, a myriad of international dignitaries regularly attend the Olympics and often make
speeches. Furthermore, since the Olympic Charter only recognizes one delegation per nation, the
Olympic Games are often riddled with international conflict. Indeed, the Olympics are among
the world’s most politically bound forums for international sports.
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Boycotts would appear to be a form of sanctions, and governments often utilize sanctions
as a tool of foreign-policy. Governments use sanctions to signal displeasures or to change the
behavior of the recipient state. Stuart Murray has framed the use of sports as a foreign-policy
tool in another way. Murray’s “sports diplomacy”8 is less about punishing or embarrassing a
country, as would sanctions or a boycott, and more about using sporting events as a way of
making amends. From this perspective, initiating a boycott against a foreign adversary, as was
the case with the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics, would not constitute sports diplomacy.
In this work I define the term “sports diplomacy” more broadly than does Murray. In this study,
by sports diplomacy I mean the political use of sporting events and competitions by governments
to influence and/or pressure the behavior of, or to embarrass and humiliate, other states. Such
political use might include a boycott, sanctions, diplomacy, or a public accusation of corruption
or cheating.
Scholarship on the 1980 Moscow Olympics boycott has generally not addressed the
decision-making process that led to the boycott. Instead, it has primarily examined the event
from an historical perspective. President Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Olympics is
important and warrants attention because governments continue to use sporting boycotts as a
foreign-policy tool. Using President Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics in
reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a case study, this thesis will explain the
decision-making process that led to the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Primary
sources, including past interviews, speeches, memoirs, and official memoranda, this thesis will
place the Carter administration’s decision to boycott the Moscow Olympics within the
framework of international sanctions. The Carter administration was aware that the boycott
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would not force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Instead, President Carter used the
Olympics boycott as a symbolic measure to embarrass publicly the Soviet Union. Carter, his
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made the
decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics in the context of their knowledge and
perceptions about Soviet behavior and the potentially powerful impact of such a decision on the
Soviet Union’s standing at the Olympics and in the world. The Carter administration chose to
adopt this approach despite its view that it would unlikely bring about a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Although these American foreign-policy makers understood that other sanctions
had repeatedly failed, they believed that it would send a strong message that the Carter
administration was ready to get tough with the Soviet Union.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Sanctions and International Relations
Sporting boycotts in international relations fall within the framework of sanctions.
Sanctions are an instrument of statecraft, part of a larger set of foreign-policy tools. Margan,
Babat, and Krustev define sanctions as “actions that one or more countries take to limit or end
their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one
or more of its policies.”9 Similarly, Lutfullah Mangi defines a sanction as: “an action initiated by
one or more international actors against one or more others with either or both of two purposes:
to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply
with certain norms the senders deem important.”10 A state-sponsored sanction could include
severing diplomatic relations, boycotting cultural or sports events, imposing commercial
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sanctions on imports and exports, or establishing a naval blockade.11 Usually, sanctions have a
strong economic component. Since sporting boycotts are used to deprive the target state of some
value – however broadly construed -- and to pressure the state to comply with certain norms,
sporting boycotts fall within the framework of sanctions.
The United States has often utilized sanctions as a foreign-policy tool. Since World War
II, the United States has implemented more sanctions than any other country.12 Several reasons
help to explain why the U.S. has imposed sanctions so frequently, particularly after World War
II. In the decade following the Second World War, the international community took steps to
bind states together in an international organization that promoted peaceful negotiation,
collective security, and in an effort on the part of powerful states to create a balance of power to
prevent war and to encourage the superpowers to spend less on its arms race.13 Sanctions offered
states a mechanism for pressuring other states while avoiding a military confrontation, thus
decreasing the likelihood of war. This post-war era thus introduced the routine use of sanctions,
including sports boycotts, as a foreign-policy tool. For the Carter administration, confronting the
Soviet Union with military force in the case of Afghanistan would have been costly and futile.
Thus, the administration utilized sanctions.
Many scholars have debated the efficacy of sanctions in international relations, and
overwhelmingly scholars argue that sanctions often fail to achieve their intended goals. Robert
Pape argues, for example, that despite their increased use in international relations, economic
sanctions routinely fall well short of their goals.14 For a sanction to be successful, the target state
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must concede to a significant portion of the coercer’s demands. Pape’s analysis concludes that
sanctions succeed in attaining their goals in only about four percent of cases studied.15
Furthermore, Pape’s analysis found no correlation between the harshness of the punishment and
the target’s concessions.16 A large group of international relations scholars confirms Pape’s
argument that sanctions usually do not work.
Sanctions fall far short for a variety of reasons. First, since states often resort to sanctions
after other policies have failed, it is highly unlikely that sanctions will coerce the offending state
into changing its behavior.17 In this case, the target state is committed to its course of behavior.
Modern states appear to be willing to endure the high costs of sanctions in the pursuit of their
interests.18
Another reason that sanctions often fall short is because they tend to rally nationalism in
the target state. The surge of popular support by citizens who increasingly believe that their state
is being bullied by another more powerful state leads to a resurgence of confidence and
obstinacy on the part of the offending regime.19 Consequently, the targeted state becomes more –
not less – troublesome. Third, sanctions often harm the people in the targeted state and have no
impact on the ruling elite. Political elites can generally find alternative markets to supply their
needs. Citizens, however, are forced to conserve or cut consumption. This sometimes leads to a
significant level of suffering on the part of the people.
Fourth, sanctions are often costly to the state imposing them. For example, President
Carter’s 1979 decision to cut wheat imports to the Soviet Union in protest of the invasion of
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Afghanistan proved to be costlier for the American wheat producer than the Soviet consumer.
The Soviet Union simply went elsewhere to procure wheat.20 Foreign-policy decision makers
must weigh the costs associated with sanctions against projected benefits when deciding to
impose a sanction. President Carter’s 1980 Olympics boycott failed to modify Soviet behavior,
but it did inflict some harm on the Soviet Union and cost the U.S. very little.
While their overall success rate is limited, sanctions sometimes succeed. Scholars
generally measure success by the extent to which the sanctions induced the target nation to
comply with the wishes of the punishing country.21 Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz have argued that a
target country will yield to a coercer’s demands if it initially underestimates the impact of the
sanctions, miscalculates the sender’s determination to impose the sanctions, or wrongly believes
that the sanctions would be imposed whether it concedes or not.22 Sanctions may also work when
the target is already experiencing economic difficulties, the sanction is forcefully implemented,
the sender has few costs associated with the sanction, few countries are needed to implement the
sanction, and/or the sanction is not imposed in conjunction with covert military action.23 In the
case of the Olympic boycott, the Carter administration implemented it over a course of seven
months, in conjunction with covert military action in Afghanistan and declining domestic
support.
Although sanctions rarely work, states continue to utilize them as foreign-policy tools
because they can serve as powerful domestic political tools, and they can be powerful symbols.24
Sanctions can be used to satisfy a domestic group or demonstrate that the government cares and
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is acting. The symbolic value of a sanction can operate at both the domestic and international
level. By imposing a sanction, a policymaker may garner domestic support while simultaneously
signaling discontent with the target.25 With President Carter, the American public broadly
supported his policy as addressing Soviet aggression, while sending a message of discontent to
the Soviet Union.
Looking specifically at sporting boycotts, scholars also question their efficacy as a tool of
foreign-policy. For example, Dain and Calder argue that sporting boycotts are not effective in
encouraging a government to change its actions.26 Strengthening links between countries rather
than severing ties is a more constructive approach to highlighting and eradicating problems, they
argue. Marlene Goldsmith identifies two examples that support this argument. First, participating
in the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Jesse Owens ably defeated his German counterpart. This German
defeat raised much bigger questions internationally about Adolph Hitler’s questionable belief
that the Aryan race was supreme.27 Second, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and an
overwhelming number of countries boycotted sporting competitions with South Africa during the
apartheid. While the sporting boycott likely had little effect on the Apartheid regime, it did raise
international awareness of the human-rights abuses in the country.28 Thus, sporting boycotts may
not achieve their intended goals. They might, however, achieve another lesser, yet important,
goal.
Sports and Foreign-policy
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Using sports as a foreign-policy tools provides an example of states’ relying on soft
power to shape the behavior of other states. Stuart Murray found that in the second half of the
twentieth century countries have established strong relationships among politics, diplomacy, and
sport.29 The main thrust of Murray’s writing is that sports diplomacy could be used to reduce
estrangement and conflict, as well as promote greater development and dialogue between two
countries or among a collection of states. Sports diplomacy can thus encompass negotiations,
compromise, and peace, despite the competitive nature of sports. Sports diplomacy is “low risk,
low cost, and high profile.”30 Although Murray highlights the potential for building friendly
relations through sports diplomacy, the Carter administration showcases how sports diplomacy
could be used as a punitive tool.
Sporting boycotts are a tool of foreign-policy, but sporting federations are actors who are
independent of their respective governments. In Trevor Taylor’s examination of the relationship
between sports and foreign-policy, he categorizes sports as an international nongovernmental
organization (INGO) with respect to their federations.31 Within the parameters of an INGO,
sports incorporate an international dimension, general rules, and a governing body. Sports are
associated with nationalism because many federations’ rules permit only one federation per
state.32
One of the most significant arguments made by Taylor—that sports and sporting
federations are actors—helps to provide an often-overlooked component of sports and foreignpolicy. Sports authorities seek the maximum amount of freedom in actions from their
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governments.33 Federations such as the International Olympics Committee (IOC) work to
minimize that freedom. For example, the IOC prohibits national federations from exercising
political influence. The nominally apolitical relationship between sports federations and
governments becomes muddled, however, because many national federations receive
governmental funding.34 Meanwhile, sporting authorities have their own interest in holding
competition, and this can conflict with the interests of a state. This tension was very much
present during President Carter’s boycott effort.
Taylor also argues that sports are a positive, active, even enjoyable foreign-policy tool.
International sports are a source of favorable publicity.35 Through the use of sports, governments
can send diplomatic signals without being directly involved. Taylor cites China’s use of “pingpong diplomacy” with the United Kingdom and United States as an example of this.36 China sent
a signal that they were ready to open diplomatically and economically by inviting the United
States and the United Kingdom for a ping pong competition. This offered a non-confrontational
approach to initiating diplomatic discussions.
Sports as a foreign-policy tool can sometimes become problematic. Dain and Calder have
identified both the appeals and problems associated with using sporting boycotts as a foreignpolicy tool. Sporting boycotts are meant to be symbolic and make a strong statement, given that
sports are universal. The use of sports as a foreign-policy tool often undermines the comradery
and good relationships that they are supposed to promote. The decision on the part of the
international cricket teams to boycott matches with Zimbabwe illustrates this problem.37 From
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this perspective, Dain and Calder point to the tension between trying to maintain solid diplomatic
relations and a normal sporting relationship with a country while simultaneously pressuring it to
improve its human-rights record or administration of justice.38 Regular sporting relations could
lead the public to believe that the government retains normalcy, respect, and support.39 Indeed,
President Carter argued that since the United States strongly condemned the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan; the U.S. simply could not conduct business as usual with the U.S.S.R.
Dain and Calder raise other critical issues associated with using sporting boycotts. If an
actor imposes a sporting boycott against every state with whom there is conflict, these scholars
ask, would not international sports become a farce because of too many boycotts?40 Given that
boycotts are meant to make a statement, this could serve as a deterrent from imposing too many
boycotts and decreasing their effectiveness.
President Carter and the 1980 Olympics Boycott
Although the Olympics are meant to be apolitical, historian Allen Guttman has argued
that the creation of the Olympics had political motivations.41 According to Guttman, states
established the Olympics, in part, as a means of reconciliation for feuding countries. To ensure
reconciliation, the Olympic national federations were to maintain neutral political perspectives.42
Despite the efforts to eliminate politics from the Olympics, politics have remained a central issue
in deciding who hosts and who participates in the Games.
The intersection between politics and sport was especially evident during the Cold War.
Although the Soviet Union controlled its National Olympic Committee and the U.S. exercises
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considerably less control over its Olympic Committee, the United States was the first country of
the two to use the Olympics as a political tool.43 Young and Guttman argue that the Carter
Administration chose to boycott the 1980 Olympics because it could come up with no other
viable options. Military confrontation would have been unwise, and the boycott had little
associated costs economically and politically. The Carter administration clearly understood that
the boycott would not coerce the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.44 It would,
however, send a strong message of protest and raise international awareness of the invasion,
which was a clear violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.
The Carter administration’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow
is one of the most discussed sporting boycotts; however, there is little writing on the subject from
an American foreign-policy perspective. Nicolas Sarantakes’ Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter,
the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War provides an extensive historical analysis of the event.
Sarantakes strongly criticizes the decision to boycott the Olympics.45 This thesis will draw upon
Sarantake’s work by analyzing the decision-making process within the Carter administration.
The way Carter’s foreign-policy advisors framed the issue of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan affected the policies that President Carter later implemented. In an examination of
foreign-policy in the Carter administration, Jean Garrison has argued that actors frame issues in a
way that supports their policy positions.46 Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance each presented differing
perspectives on the issue, and each contributed to shaping the administration’s foreign-policy.
During the early stages of the Carter presidency, the president tried to incorporate both the

43

Christopher Young, "Olympic Boycotts: Always Tricky," Dissent 55, no. 3 (2008): 68
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, New York:
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983, 430.
45
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 13.
46
Jean A. Garrison, "Framing Foreign-policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and
the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda," Political Psychology 22, no. 4 (2001): 775.
44

14
recommendations of Brzezinski and Vance in an effort to create consistency and consensus
within his foreign-policy.47 Garrison argues that individuals, including Vance and Brzezinski,
who enjoyed greater access to President Carter could influence and control his knowledge of the
Soviet Union and its invasion into Afghanistan.48 National Security Advisor Brzezinski exercised
more influence over Carter than did Vance. Brzezinski’s interpretation of the Soviet-Afghan war
markedly shaped the president’s interpretation of both Soviet policy and the appropriate options
for U.S. response, including an Olympic boycott.
Scholars generally agree that sanctions and boycotts fall short in achieving their intended
goals. This assessment extends to sporting boycotts and the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Utilizing
the framework provided on sanctions, sports as a foreign-policy tool, the 1980 Moscow
Olympics boycott, and drawing on the evidence provided by both primary and secondary
sources, this work offers a case study of the Carter administration’s decision to boycott
Moscow’s Summer Olympics and the factors that contributed to the decision.
METHODS
For this thesis, I will examine the efficacy of sporting boycotts as a tool of foreign-policy
and the associated decision-making process. The Carter administration’s decision-making
process will be assessed through primary sources, dating from November 1979 to May 1980, that
shed light on the Soviet-Afghan war and the boycott. These primary sources include speeches,
documents provided by the Carter Presidential Library, written records of interviews with key
actors, official memoranda and correspondence during the Carter presidency, and declassified
documents provided by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In addition, I will examine media
coverage, and newspapers. The memoirs of President Jimmy Carter, former Secretary of State
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Cyrus Vance, and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski also offer further
insight into the decision-making process during this time. The memoirs and historical accounts
of secondary actors, such as former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, public opinion surveys,
and accounts by Olympic athletes, and the U.S. Olympic Committee will also be included in this
analysis.
I have tried to rely on primary sources because they provide the best insight on the
decision-making process during the Carter presidency. Memoirs written by Carter, Vance, and
Brzezinski offer a lucid recounting of the events during that time. Some of the limitations of
these sources include the fact that they were written retroactively, and Carter, Vance, and
Brzezinski mostly recounted from memory and personal notes in their writing. Such writing may
be subject to some inaccuracies and may not be objective. To mitigate these issues, secondary
sources are included as a supplement.
EARLY CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Carter Presidency
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Carter
administration was defined by negotiations on nuclear arms deals—such as the Strategic Arms
and Limitations Treaty II (SALT II), Cold War politics, and the Carter administration’s foreignpolicy goals surrounding human rights. SALT II, a potentially significant nuclear-arms treaty
negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States, was neither approved by the
Congress nor signed by President Carter. Carter’s personal principles relating to human rights
and its influence on his foreign-policy stood out as a source of tension between the United States
and the Soviet Union.49 The Carter administration held the belief that the Soviet Union was an
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aggressor in world affairs, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Although President Carter
wanted to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries
deteriorated rapidly.
As the newly elected President of the United States in 1977, President Jimmy Carter wanted
to set a new precedent for American foreign-policy. He believed that the United States had lost
its position as the moral authority and primary advocate for democracy after the Vietnam War,
the Watergate scandal, and President Gerald Ford’s pardons.50 President Carter believed that a
moral and idealistic approach to foreign-policy was realistic, and that moral principles were the
best guidelines in shaping the use of American power and influence abroad. Both National
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wholly supported
Carter’s desire to advocate for human rights.51 Indeed, human rights stood out as perhaps the
single most important focus of the Carter administration’s foreign-policy team.
President Carter wanted to improve U.S.-Soviet relations while not ignoring Soviet humanrights violations. Initially, Carter believed he could both build better relations with Moscow and
address its human-rights problems.52 These two goals quickly came into conflict with one
another. President Carter’s support of Soviet dissidents such as Vladimir Slepak and Andrei
Amalrik effected a source of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States; Soviet
leaders viewed Washington’s push for democratization and human rights as an excuse for
meddling in Soviet internal affairs.53 As time progressed Carter became markedly less optimistic
regarding his ability to work closely with the Soviet Union. He became more suspicious of
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Soviet motives, particularly regarding Moscow’s military ventures in the Middle East and
Africa.54 Instead of cooperating, Carter began to view the Soviet Union pessimistically and
assessed their motives in terms of competition.
President Carter was critical of past administrations’ initiatives with the Soviet Union.
President Richard Nixon initiated détente, which was meant to ease tension between the United
States and the Soviet Union, prevent a nuclear war, and progress toward normalizing relations
between the two nations. Carter believed that the détente initiatives, including SALT I, had
favored the Soviet Union.55 Nuclear arms-control was important to President Carter because he
viewed it as a first step toward better relations with the Soviet Union.56 He expressed such
sentiments in his memoir: “My intention was to cooperate with the Soviets whenever possible,
and I saw a successful effort in controlling nuclear weapons as the best tool for improving our
relations.”57 Carter aggressively promoted SALT II because he believed that it would provide a
basis for a reciprocal relationship between the two countries. The Carter administration sought to
cap the number of nuclear arms on the part of both countries. But this goal conflicted with his
negative perception of the Soviets as an aggressor.58 The administration and Congress struggled
to separate the issue of Soviet military adventurism from the SALT II negotiations.59 Although
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. negotiated the treaty successfully, Congress did not support it, and
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ultimately the president did not ratify it primarily because of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.60
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Part of the reason the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because it viewed the country’s
ruling communist party as untrustworthy and incapable of maintaining control.61 Afghans
rebelled against the Khalq Communist Party, Afghanistan’s ruling party, which was led by Noor
Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin.62 Before the Soviet-Afghan War, the Khalq
Communist Party overthrew the existing Afghan government, installing Nur Mohammad Taraki
as president.63 The modernizing reforms instituted by the Taraki government were unpopular,
and the regime repressed political opponents. After the assassination of Taraki, his rival,
Hafizullah Amin, seized control of the Afghan government and ruling party. Amin instituted
policies in disregard of Soviet counsel. Although Amin’s policies were socialist, they were
brutally implemented in an underdeveloped Muslim country.64 These new socialist policies
coupled with Amin’s repressive regime spawned widespread rebellion, which the Amin
government could not control despite Soviet military aid.65 Because of Amin’s disregard for
Soviet preferences and the growing insurgency, the Soviet Union viewed the Afghan regime as
unruly, unpredictable, and threatening.66 The Soviets also worried that in desperation Amin
would turn to the West or China for help. Thus, the Soviet Union exploited factions within the
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Khalq Communist Party, and supported Amin’s political opponents, which culminated in the
1979 invasion.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had both offensive and defensive elements. The Soviet
Union wanted to restore order in its neighboring country; it was genuinely concerned about the
political instability on its border.67 Soviet leaders also believed that inaction would have a
spillover effect in other Muslim countries and Eastern Europe against socialist governments.
During that time, the Soviet Union was geopolitically surrounded by adversaries such as India
and China.

*Map of the Soviet Union in the 1980s.68

Following the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union wanted to defend the ideal of socialism
internationally.69 In Soviet propaganda related to the invasion, the Soviet press claimed that the
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invasion was in response to threats from the West. The United States had increased its military
budget and military actions in Iran during the hostage crisis. The Soviet Union wanted to be in a
better position to exploit chaos in Iran and feared that the United States was attempting to drive
Afghanistan into its strategic arc.70 Although the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned about its
border, it also considered Afghanistan’s strategic position.
Soviet leadership believed that the U.S. would not respond to the invasion because of other
world events. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviets chose
this date because they knew that American officials would not be available because of the
Christmas holiday.71 Furthermore, the Soviet leadership believed that the United States would be
too preoccupied with the Iran hostage crisis to respond quickly and effectively to the Afghanistan
issue. The distraction of the Iran hostage crisis became more apparent during the boycotting
effort after the failed U.S. led rescue mission in Tehran in late April 1980. After initial success in
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union struggled to restore order, and the effort became a failure.72 The
Soviet Union resorted to greater force in the country and ultimately remained in Afghanistan
until 1989.
U.S. Reactions to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
From the perspective of the Carter administration, the Soviet Union was meddling in
Afghanistan’s political affairs. Publicly, Soviet leadership claimed that it invaded Afghanistan
for defensive purposes and that Afghan officials requested its help.73 Carter rebuffed the Soviet
claim that only military advisors had entered Afghanistan in an attempt to strengthen opposition
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forces in Kabul.74 The Carter administration argued that the Afghan government prior to the
invasion had wanted to maintain its independence, and that the Soviets had installed a new
Afghan president who served as their puppet.75 Carter saw Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as
a prelude for further activity in the region. During President Carter’s “Address to the Nation on
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” on January 4, 1980, he stated:
This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further
Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an
aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world… We must
recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Sovietoccupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible
control over much of the world's oil supplies… In the meantime, neither the United States
nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do
business as usual with the Soviet Union. Although the United States would prefer not to
withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union
must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of
athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the
Olympic games.76
Carter believed that Soviet control of Afghanistan could allow the U.S.S.R. access to Iran and
thus disrupt the export of oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. Communist Party General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev promised Carter that he would withdraw troops once his military had
achieved its objective. But no withdrawal took place. In fact, at one point the Soviet had more
than 100,000 troops were deployed in Afghanistan.77 This increasingly tense situation became a
high-priority crisis for the Carter administration.
In reaction to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration took
multiple actions. Prior to the Soviet invasion, opposition groups within the U.S. had criticized the
president for not countering Soviet gains. In response to this criticism he adopted a tough stance
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on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.78 Although Carter had pronounced the Carter Doctrine, he
was not ready to engage militarily with the Soviet Union. Thus, President Carter sought other
means to hinder Soviet progress in Afghanistan. For example, he implemented an economic
embargo, halted grain and technology sales, and revoked Soviet fishing rights in American
territorial waters.79 The U.S. government canceled all diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets.
Moreover, the U.S. took the lead at the United Nations (U.N.) in convincing 140 countries,
including some Soviet allies, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.80 In addition,
members of the Carter administration met with members of the Afghan insurgency. The U.S.
then provided covert military aid to the group.81 Finally, President Carter announced that the
United States would boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
The Olympic Boycott
On January 20, 1980, during a Meet the Press interview, President Jimmy Carter
announced that the United States would not send athletes to the 1980 Summer Olympics in
Moscow if the Soviet Union did not remove its troops from Afghanistan within a month.82 In his
Meet the Press interview with Bill Monroe, President Carter stated:
Neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to
Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I've sent a message today to the
United States Olympic Committee spelling out my own position: that unless the Soviets
withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan, that the Olympic games be
moved from Moscow to an alternate site or multiple sites or postponed or canceled. If the
Soviets do not withdraw their troops immediately from Afghanistan within a month, I
would not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics. It's very important
for the world to realize how serious a threat the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan is.83
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A month passed, and Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. Thus, the United States did not
send a delegation to the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
Two other international events are important in relation to the United States’ decision to
boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The first event was the 1979 fall of the Shah of
Iran and the subsequent Iran hostage crisis. On November 4, 1979, students in Iran stormed the
United States embassy in Tehran, taking 60 Americans hostage after the United States admitted
the Shah into the United States for medical treatment.84 The Iran hostage crisis wholly occupied
the attention of the Carter administration’s foreign-policy team and influenced its decisions for
the remainder of the Carter presidency. The second event of importance was the 1980 Winter
Olympics in Lake Placid, New York.85 At this time, it was still uncertain whether the Carter
administration would follow through with the boycott, and the Soviet Union participated in the
Lake Placid Games. The United States’ hockey team was not expected to earn a medal during the
Games but went on to defeat the Soviet Union’s elite and nearly undefeated hockey team.86 The
game was touted as a match between democracy and communism. The win instilled national
pride in the American public, and Carter said he hoped the gold medal was an omen for better
times.87 What became known as the “Miracle on Ice,” went on to undermine public support for
the Carter administration’s effort to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
KEY ACTORS
Any assessment of the Carter administration’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer
Olympics in Moscow requires an analysis of the critical actors who influenced the decision to
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implement a sporting boycott. The Carter administration wanted to embarrass and punish the
Soviet Union. Several factors contributed to the implementation of the sporting boycott as a
foreign-policy tool. Each key actor’s background, beliefs, and perceptions of the Soviet Union
led to his recommendation of or acquiesce to the boycott. The primary actors identified in
relation to the decision to boycott the Olympics are President Jimmy Carter, National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. These three actors were the
primary decision makers in American foreign-policy from 1977 to 1981.
President Jimmy Carter
Carter’s personal approach to foreign-policy influenced his decision to boycott the
Moscow Olympics. President Carter perceived a “malaise” among citizens that reflected
widespread disillusionment primarily because of the violent anti-war movement, the defeat in
Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal. Carter, a deeply religious Christian, sought to restore the
public’s belief and commitment to moral values and justice. As an extension of this, Carter
wanted the United States to claim the moral high ground in world affairs and advocated for
human rights in his practice of foreign-policy. Such sentiments are expressed in Carter’s writing:
“Our country has been strongest and most effective when morality and a commitment to freedom
and democracy have been most clearly emphasized in our foreign-policy.”88
Carter understood that his commitment to human rights was viewed as naïve and
idealistic. He argued nonetheless that American idealism was practical and realistic in foreign
affairs because moral principles, in his view, offered the best way to exert American power and
influence. President Carter also embraced “public diplomacy,” which relied heavily on widely
available information and open international exchanges. Carter preferred economic and
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diplomatic action over military action, and this is evinced in his response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Although the U.S. government did not frame the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
as a human-rights issue, the Carter administration frequently used language couched in moral
principles as justification for the Olympic boycott.
The organization and protocols of Carter’s cabinet influenced how the decision was
crafted regarding the Olympics boycott. Carter had organized his policy-advisory system to
promote open dialogue, an environment in which advisors would listen and participate in a
healthy debate.89 During meetings, Carter would remain at the center of the discussions,
receiving advice and information from his many advisors.90 In this setting, Carter was able to
hear the arguments of both Brzezinski and Vance regarding the Soviet Union. Although this type
of organization of Carter’s advisory system was supposed to promote teamwork among his
foreign-policy advisors, it created tension and debates riddled with infighting.91 Given the
tension, Carter grew increasingly dependent on Brzezinski and Vance, who themselves competed
with one another to see who could exercise the most influence over the president.
In general, Brzezinski mistrusted the Soviet leaders and emphasized competition when
assessing their motives.92 Vance was more willing to trust Soviet intentions and wanted Carter to
move beyond East-West competition. Often Brzezinski was better positioned to gain access to
and influence over President Carter. Brzezinski chaired the Special Coordination Committee
(SCC), which handled crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.93 Brzezinski also had a
direct line to President Carter and met with him daily for security briefings. Secretary of State
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Cyrus Vance resented Brzezinski’s influence on President Carter. This resentment ultimately
contributed to Vance’s resignation.94 Observers of the Carter presidency assert that the president
was an eager student of Brzezinski, and that Carter’s relationship with Vance was more distant
and formal.95 President Carter was admittedly closer to Brzezinski and the Nation Security
Council (NSC) staff.96 Thus, Brzezinski enjoyed more influence than Vance over Carter’s
decision-making process.
President Carter’s perception of the Soviet Union evolved throughout his presidency.
During the early stages of his presidency, Carter was optimistic about the Soviet Union’s
motives.97 He hoped to build a better relationship with the Soviet Union and to work towards
nuclear arms reduction. Carter’s optimistic view of the Soviet Union aligned with that of Cyrus
Vance. As time progressed, however, Carter grew disillusioned and moved to adopt a more
negative view of Soviet motives.98 Carter’s negative perception of the Soviet Union grew out of
Moscow’s response to his human-rights advocacy, the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski, and
Soviet military aggression. Given Brzezinski’s access to the president and his negative
perception of Soviet motives, he skillfully shaped Carter’s growing perception that the Soviets
were to be perceived as an adversary. Soviet behavior, particularly its military activities,
strengthened the negative perceptions of both Carter and Brzezinski. Thus, over time Carter
adopted a more confrontational approach toward the Soviet Union.
In the case of Afghanistan, Carter believed that the Soviet Union was an aggressor
against a deeply religious and independent country. Carter expressed this in his memoir: “The
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invasion of Afghanistan was direct aggression by the Soviet armed forces against a freedomloving people, whose leaders had been struggling to retain a modicum of independence from
their huge neighbor.”99 Carter believed that the Soviet Union wanted to overthrow the existing
Afghan government to expand Moscow’s sphere of influence.100 To Carter, Afghanistan had
been violently reduced to a Soviet puppet state, which had further implications in the Persian
Gulf region.101 If the Soviets consolidated power in Afghanistan, then the balance of power
would be in Moscow’s favor in the region. At the time of the invasion, Carter wrote in his diary:
“This is the most serious international development that has occurred since I have been
President, and unless the Soviets recognize that it has been counterproductive for them we will
face additional serious problems with invasions or subversions in the future.”102 During Carter’s
1980 State of the Union Address, he introduced the Carter Doctrine, which asserted that any
threat by a country against the Persian Gulf would be viewed as a threat against the U.S., and the
U.S. would respond to the threat by any means necessary.103 The Carter Doctrine directly
targeted the Soviet Union; indeed, it was a clear response to Soviet aggression.
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
Although National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski possessed a nuanced
knowledge of the Soviet Union as an historian, President Carter initially lacked extensive
knowledge of foreign-policy. Consequently, he relied heavily on Brzezinski to educate and
instruct him on U.S.-Soviet relations.104 In his memoir, Carter described Brzezinski as
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knowledgeable, providing him with acute analyses of global occurrences.105 Brzezinski’s
approach to foreign-policy was centered on a strong defense.106 As a part of the National
Security Council (NSC), Brzezinski developed innovative policies toward the Soviet Union in an
effort to balance the diplomatic aims of the State Department. However, this political
strategizing took place within an environment of mistrust. Brzezinski remained highly suspicious
of Soviet claims throughout the Carter presidency.
Brzezinski’s personal history shaped his views toward the Soviet Union. Born and raised
in Poland, Brzezinski had studied the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and
possessed a profound knowledge of communist governments and ideologies.107 The son of a
Polish diplomat, Brzezinski spent time in Warsaw, Canada, and finally the U.S., where he
attended graduate school at Harvard University. Brzezinski’s Polish origin remained a source of
controversy among opponents of the Carter administration because they his background made
him biased against the Soviet Union. Many of Brzezinski’s critics saw him as overly
aggressive.108 Critics of Brzezinski pointed to the many disagreements between Brzezinski and
Vance over the direction of policy as evidence of such aggression.109 Brzezinski, more vocal and
outspoken, continued to wield a more powerful position than Vance.110 In fact, Carter regularly
asked Brzezinski to speak on his behalf at public events. Brzezinski’s tenure as NSA came to be
wholly defined by his difficult relationship with Cyrus Vance and his extremely close friendship
with the president.

105

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith,
Danielle Lewis, “Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89,” The New York
Times, published May 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/us/zbigniew-brzezinski-dead-nationalsecurity-adviser-to-carter.html.
107
Danielle Lewis, “Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89.”
108
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, 55.
109
Jean Garrison, “Framing Foreign-policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the
Struggle for Arms Control Agenda,” 776.
110
Ibid., 788.
106

29
During the Soviet crisis, Brzezinski met with Carter daily for the Presidential Daily
Briefing.111 As chairman of the SCC, Brzezinski took the lead on the administration’s response
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.112 Although Vance also served on this committee, his role
remained limited. If the SCC agreed to something, chairman Brzezinski personally delivered to
the president the Presidential Directive for signing.113
Moreover, Carter trusted Brzezinski and admired his bold and confident style. Brzezinski
made decisions quickly and implemented them even more quickly.114 The two men also shared a
close friendship. They jogged together, watched movies, and often dined together.115 Brzezinski
had a hand in writing most of Carter’s major foreign-policy speeches, generally prepared by the
NSC speechwriters. In his memoir, Brzezinski explained that he intentionally shaped Carter’s
views and policies toward the Soviet Union.116 Brzezinski’s access to Carter on foreign-policy
issues was unmatched by Vance, and he used this access to influence the president on Soviet
policy.
President Carter’s development of a negative perception of the Soviet Union reflected
Brzezinski’s mistrust of the Soviets. Brzezinski’s primary objective upon entering the White
House was to improve the United States’ strategic position in relation to the Soviet Union.117
Zbigniew Brzezinski believed that one of the primary problems that the Carter administration
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had with the Soviet Union was that it had trouble maintaining its credibility in Moscow.118
Brzezinski was concerned that the Soviet’s growing military power would exacerbate issues in
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa. He also worried that the Soviet Union sought to
displace the U.S. as an international power.119 Consequently, Brzezinski urged Carter to project a
tougher stance toward Moscow. From this perspective, Brzezinski saw the human-rights
approach as a counter to Soviet ideology.120 His chief recommendations to the president included
condemning Soviet intervention in Africa, strengthening NATO defense, increasing defense
spending, and publicly exposing the Kremlin’s military buildup.121 Brzezinski encouraged
Carter to promote the image of America as a “city upon a hill”, thus framing the Soviets as an
aggressor that the United States must counteract.122
Regarding Afghanistan, Brzezinski’s interpreted the Soviet invasion as a direct threat to
the U.S. security. Brzezinski argued that the invasion essentially transformed Afghanistan from a
buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union to an offensive Soviet instrument to be
used to strengthen control of the Indian Ocean.123 In a memorandum to President Carter,
Brzezinski called for a strong and decisive response to the Soviet invasion, which included
possible military confrontation and the showcasing of public outrage.124 Brzezinski raised the
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issue repeatedly with President Carter during his briefings; he wanted to implement a sustained
and costly reaction.
At the time, public opinion had turned somewhat against Carter. It viewed him
increasingly as soft and indecisive. Brzezinski encouraged the president to work toward
strengthening his foreign-policy image by initiating a tougher approach to Moscow’s
expansionism.125 As part of this approach Brzezinski and the NSC pressed for more stringent
actions, and the State Department complied reluctantly. Brzezinski recommended a formal
expression for the record of the U.S. position in the form of a State Department publication of
Soviet activities in Afghanistan. He also urged Carter to demonstrate publicly sympathy for the
Afghan insurgents. Carter implemented all these recommendations.126
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was another major actor in the Carter administration’s
foreign-policy decision-making process. Like Brzezinski, Secretary Vance was present during
the Carter presidential campaign. In his memoir, Vance notes that he spent a lot of time with
Carter before his presidency, informing him on foreign affairs, but a close bond did not
develop.127 When Carter asked Vance about Brzezinski’s serving as National Security Advisor,
Vance requested two commitments.128 First, Vance wanted Carter to be clear and firm that Vance
was the sole spokesman for foreign-policy. Second, he wanted to give Carter his
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recommendations separately from Brzezinski.129 As time progressed, Vance describes a breach
in this understanding.
Both Brzezinski and Vance had the opportunity to influence President Carter on foreignpolicy. During a weekly Presidential Breakfast, Vance, Brzezinski and Carter would meet to
speak frankly about foreign-policy issues.130 Secretary Vance also submitted foreign-policy
briefings to President Carter. While President Carter respected and listened to Vance, he viewed
his policies recommendations as too conservative. He much preferred the bold and innovative
policies of Zbigniew Brzezinski.
As a lawyer and head of the State Department, Vance’s approach to foreign-policy
differed from that of Brzezinski. He viewed the international system as pluralistic, whereas
Brzezinski maintained a bipolar view.131 Vance’s primary objective as Secretary of State was
diplomacy and building a better relationship with the Soviet Union. Vance preferred to reach an
agreement with the Soviet Union rather than take a confrontational approach.132 Later in the
Carter presidency, Vance understood the need for Carter to look tougher on the Soviet Union,
but he did not want to damage U.S.-Soviet relations.133 Vance advocated for actions that would
decrease conflict with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski criticized Vance’s approach to the Soviet
Union, arguing that Vance was too accommodating and eager to reach an agreement.134 Vance’s
differences with Carter and Brzezinski regarding confrontation versus diplomacy led to his
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resignation in April 1980. Cyrus Vance's beliefs on how to conduct U.S.-Soviet relations in the
end differed quite extensively from those of others within the Carter administration.
In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vance agreed that it was an issue, but
disagreed with Brzezinski and Carter on how the administration should respond. Like Carter and
Brzezinski, Vance saw the Persian Gulf as a strategically important region to the United States.
Contrary to Brzezinski and Carter, Vance believed that the reason why the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan was because, as the Soviets argued, the Soviets wanted to secure its border.135
Where the Soviets miscalculated, according to Vance, was in their expectation that the U.S. and
the international community would not react in any significant way. Although Vance believed
that the Soviet-Afghan War was important, he supported a subtler response, one that would not
complicate U.S.-Soviet relations.136 He also argued that sanctions of any kind would exacerbate
their already deteriorating relationship. Vance routinely opposed any confrontation with the
Soviet Union, an approach that the administration ultimately adopted.137
Vice President Walter Mondale
Although Vice President Walter Mondale was not a predominant decision-maker in
American foreign-policy during the Carter presidency, he did play a small role in the decision to
boycott the Moscow Olympics. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, cognizant of domestic
opinion, Mondale began to take notice of calls to boycott the Moscow Olympics. During a SCC
meeting on the Soviet invasion, Mondale suggested that the United States boycott the Moscow
Olympics.138 Later, Brzezinski, Mondale, Press Secretary Jody Powell, Warren Christopher, and
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nominally, Secretary Vance recommended to Carter that the U.S. boycott the Games. Although
Mondale was not the primary influencer on President Carter on foreign-policy, he was the person
who proposed the idea of an Olympic boycott.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BOYCOTT
President Jimmy Carter
President Carter had little prior knowledge of the intricacies of the Olympics and
international sport federations before he decided to boycott the Moscow Olympics. He initially
ignored the option of boycotting because the response would be delayed, and the move would
hurt American athletes.139 However, Carter was swayed to impose the boycott because he
believed that the United States’ absence from the Olympics would deliver a significant blow to
Soviet prestige.140 Early on, President Carter wanted to host an alternative competition to the
Olympics to appease the athletes and retain public support. However, he neither understood the
symbolism of the Olympic movement nor committed enough resources to the alternate
competition, which would require housing, sporting facilities, and security.141 The administration
struggled to obtain support from other countries and athletes for the alternate games; the prestige
of the Olympics could not be matched by this alternative competition and few countries agreed
to participate.
The USOC nominally had the right to determine whether the United States would boycott
the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. No one within the Carter administration had contacted
the USOC before announcing the boycott.142 When organizing the boycott, Carter spent much of
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his time lobbying government officials who had little control over whether their country would
send a delegation to Moscow.143 Later, however, President Carter, his staff, and Congress spent
time lobbying the USOC and other countries’ Olympic federations to boycott the Games in
Moscow. These events showcased the Carter administration’s progression in the boycotting
effort.
Over time Carter came to understand the intricacies of the Olympics. For example, Carter
cited the Olympic principles related to good sportsmanship and fair play as justification for the
boycott, arguing that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated these principles.144 In relation
to the boycotting effort, Carter wrote:
Throughout the spring, Congress and I had been trying to induce the United States
Olympic Committee and the committees in as many other nations as possible not to
attend the Olympic Games scheduled in Moscow… We had to struggle all the way; the
outcome was always in doubt. Most Olympic committees were wholly independent
bodies, whose members deeply resented any government involvement in their decisions.
Nevertheless, in television interviews, speeches, and through direct appeals during
official meetings, I and many other national leaders pointed out that it would be a
violation of Olympic principles of good sportsmanship and fair play to be guests of the
Soviet Union under existing circumstances.145
Despite the boycott being one of many actions that President Carter enacted in response to the
Soviet invasion, he acknowledged that none of these actions would force the Soviet Union out of
Afghanistan.146 Instead, Carter wanted to make the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as costly as
possible. In this, Carter wanted to punish the Soviet Union. By boycotting the Moscow
Olympics, the United States would send a strong symbolic message to the Soviet Union.
Carter was criticized for announcing the one-month deadline publicly because it
committed him to action prematurely. Because of Carter’s early announcement on Meet the
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Press and the one-month deadline, more actors became involved with the implementation of the
boycott, and the process lasted longer. After the mid-January one-month deadline passed, the
administration had to reaffirm the boycott in February. The question of whether the boycott
would be implemented loomed until May, when the USOC voted to boycott the Olympics in
Moscow. Finally, some questioned whether President Carter could be swayed on the decision to
boycott before the commencement of the Games in June. The implementation of the Olympics
boycott was long and delayed.
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
Brzezinski supported the boycott. He argued that the Soviets would use the Olympics as a
tool of propaganda, and that the boycott would hurt Soviet prestige.147 The boycott also had
domestic support, which solidified Brzezinski’s support. In fact, Brzezinski played a central role
in providing information regarding the boycott to both Carter and the public. For Carter, he
delivered briefings on the boycott’s progress.148 For the public, he explained the rationale of the
policy. For example, when addressing American Olympic athletes, he explained how sports is an
extension of politics, providing the justification for the boycott. Brzezinski remained active and
aggressive in implementing the boycott in an effort to punish the Soviet Union in an extremely
public forum.
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance opposed the boycott. Instead, he wanted to open
communications with the Soviets. Despite these reservations, he publicly stood behind the
administration’s decision and helped implement the policy.149 For example, in a Washington Post
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interview, Vance defended the boycott as necessary and justified, and he rejected the argument
that the 1936 Berlin Olympics set a historical precedent for participating in the Olympic
Games.150 Vance argued that Nazi Germany successfully used the Olympics for propaganda, and
that the Soviet Union would do the same. Moreover, Vance contended that the purpose of the
boycott was to punish Moscow for the invasion, force Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
serve as a deterrence against similar actions in the future.151 Ultimately, Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance was one of the few sources of opposition within the Carter administration, but was
obligated to show support for the action as a Cabinet member.
Vice President Walter Mondale
After suggesting that the Carter administration boycott the Moscow Olympics, Vice
President Mondale was involved with implementing the boycott by garnering domestic support.
He lobbied the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and appealed to it to persuade the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) to relocate or postpone the 1980 Summer Olympics. 152
Furthermore, Mondale served as a spokesman for President Carter, reiterating Carter’s stance
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan threatened national security. During his speech before the
USOC vote on whether to boycott the Olympics, Mondale emphasized the symbolism of the
Olympics for the Soviet Union:
When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the
Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign-policy, surely that issue is behind
us. Nor, is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the
Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the games from Soviet
domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who
might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the
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streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering
athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of
teams committed to participating—surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is
also behind us.153
Mondale also did not want athletes to feel like political pawns. He thanked them for making a
sacrifice for the greater good of the country. Drawing upon the sacrifices that American farmers
made during the grain embargo, Mondale reiterated the appeal to Olympic athletes and all
Americans to make sacrifices for their country.154 Walter Mondale sought to legitimize the use of
a sporting boycott as a sanction by gaining domestic support.
White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler
Once President Carter made the decision to boycott the Games, he delegated the task of
organizing the boycott to White House Special Counsel, Lloyd Cutler. Cutler’s sole
responsibility was to ensure that the boycott succeeded. Shortly after accepting this position,
Cutler recommended that Carter used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) to prohibit television networks such as NBC from making additional payments to the
Soviet Union to broadcast the Olympics.155 Cutler was active in lobbying corporations to cease
donations to the USOC and to support the boycotts. To supplement the lost donations going
toward the USOC, Cutler offered Robert Kane, president of the USOC, $10 million to make up
for its losses.156 Cutler also organized a meeting between Lord Killanin, the president of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and President Carter. Carter agreed to the meeting
because he wanted an opportunity to convince Killanin to support the boycott. Killanin refused
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to support the boycott, and the meeting proved to be unproductive.157 Cutler then muddled the
boycott’s decision-making process by announcing that if the Soviet Union withdrew from
Afghanistan after President Carter’s deadline, but before the Moscow Olympics, the
administration would reconsider the boycott.158 This statement was controversial, and Cutler was
increasingly viewed as an official who was creating chaos and confusion regarding the boycott.
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
The primary goal of the USOC and the IOC was to hold a successful Moscow Olympics
with all nations present. Predictably, both committees viewed the boycott as a significant blow to
the Olympics.159 To express such sentiments, on January 7, 1980, the USOC voted to resist
political intrusions into the Olympics, despite the invasion of Afghanistan.160 Killanin lobbied
officials within the Carter administration to change their minds regarding this issue. Observers of
the IOC during this period contended that Killanin was charming but unpersuasive as a
negotiator. Consequently, some scholars have argued that Killanin’s personal traits undermined
the IOC’s effort to change U.S. policy.161 Along with Killanin, Robert Kane, the president of the
USOC, also appealed to Carter to rescind the boycott.162 USOC and IOC officials argued that
Carter administration was overreacting to the Soviet invasion. Ultimately, Kane acquiesced to
the boycott because he feared that the USOC would lose its tax status and governmental funding,
which had amounted to $10 million since 1978.163 On April 22, 1980, the USOC voted 1604 to
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797 to boycott the Moscow Olympics.164 When Kane made the announcement that the United
States would not be participating in the 1980 Summer Olympics to the IOC, he cited President
Carter’s argument that participating would endanger national security. Robert Kane believed that
if the USOC sent a delegation to the Olympics, it would be unwisely challenging the president
on foreign-policy.165 Thus, the USOC accepted and cooperated with the government’s decision.
Public Opinion and the Media
The Carter administration paid close attention to public opinion. Initially, the public
supported the boycott, and the media covered it favorably. Knowing the importance of public
opinion to President Carter, Brzezinski pointed to supportive news articles as reaffirmation of the
decision to boycott.166 A Gallup Poll taken at the time to measure the level of public support of
the boycott found that 71 percent of those surveyed supported the boycott; whereas 17 percent
were opposed to the measure.167 Two months later, Gallup polling revealed that the percentage of
Americans supporting the boycott had dropped to 61 percent. An ABC-Louis Harris survey
found 55 percent of the respondents supported the boycott with 39 percent opposing it. The
remaining 6 percent were undecided.168 Other surveys found even more support for the boycott.
For example, The Washington Star asked respondents “Should the United States boycott the
Moscow Olympics?” Slightly over 85 percent responded yes, and 14 percent responded no.169
Likewise, the Boston Herald Leader received similar responses, with 85 percent supportive.170
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Public opposition to the boycott consisted of athletes and corporations who would have
profited from the Olympics. President Carter reminded American athletes that if they attempted
to compete in the Olympics, he would revoke their passports.171 NBC paid the Soviet Union $87
million for the rights to televise the Moscow Olympics.172 In response to the Carter
administration’s boycott announcement, the station began airing individual stories of the athletes
opposed to the boycott. This was done even though NBC obtained insurance to recover 98
percent of its financial commitment.173 Conversely, NBC committed to not airing the Olympics if
American athletes were not competing.
Some of the athletes felt that the government was wrongfully using them as pawns in an
international political game; others supported the boycott. For example, pentathlon athlete Linda
Cornelius Waltman saw the 1980 Moscow Olympics as her only opportunity to compete at a
high level. “For me, that was the one chance I had…That is something you shouldn’t take away
from an athlete who’s given so much and worked hard.”174 Conversely, Isaiah Thomas, at the
time a sophomore basketball player at Indiana University, stated that he sympathized with the
athletes whose careers would be tarnished by not participating in the Olympics, but understood
the move. “It was a disappointment. At that time, it was made clear to us by the president of the
stance he was taking, and the country was taking. We wanted to do what was right by our
country, so we understood and we all followed through.”175 Some disgruntled athletes sued the
USOC for voting to boycott the Olympics, but the case was dismissed.176 Public support of the
boycott began to shift after the U.S. hockey team unexpectedly defeated the Soviet Union during
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the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. After this win a Gallup Poll showed that 63
percent of respondents supported attending the Moscow Olympics if the Soviet Union withdrew
from Afghanistan before the Games.177 Opposition to the boycott was minor and came after the
decision had been made.
Congress
As an extension of public opinion, both the United States Senate and House of
Representatives supported the boycott. After the Vietnam War, members of Congress promoted a
more active congressional role in foreign-policy decisions. Consequently, the Carter
administration often turned to Congress for support and consultation.178 During the Carter
administration, Congress stepped up its involvement in Soviet affairs, including the decision to
boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. Congress, in concurrence with the Carter
administration, chose to postpone the ratification of SALT II after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and worked with President Carter to implement other sanctions against the Soviet
Union.179 Congress introduced more than a dozen resolutions in support of the Olympic boycott.
Senator David Pryor (D-AK) submitted a resolution to boycott the Olympics in Moscow, which
his colleagues overwhelmingly supported.180 Members of both the House of Representatives and
Congress broadly supported the boycott.181 In coverage Carter’s State of the Union Address, the
media recorded a longstanding applause on the part of both branches of the Congress when
Carter mentioned the boycott.182 Indeed, support for the boycott was far-reaching.
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The only notable opposition in the Senate came from Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ),
who argued that participating in the Games was politically important. Goldwater saw the attempt
to boycott the Olympics as poor foreign-policy and believed the boycott would politicize a
nominally apolitical institution.183 Like many in opposition to the Olympic boycott, Goldwater
cited Jesse Owen’s defeat of Nazi Germany’s track star in the 1936 Berlin Olympics as evidence
that participation rather than a boycott was the most efficient political tool.184 Although Congress
overwhelmingly supported the boycott, Congressional testimonies revealed some
inconsistencies. For example, during the early stages of the boycott, President Carter considered
the possibility of holding the Olympics in another location or hosting an alternative to the
Games. When Congress began to inquire about the alternatives, problems with the alternative
competition effort became apparent.185 Ultimately, Congress generally supported Carter in
support of a full boycott.
The International Community
International response to the United States decision to boycott the Olympics was mixed.
In fact, most countries in the North Atlantic Trading Organization (NATO), official U.S. allies,
chose not to boycott the Moscow Olympics for varying reasons. Margaret Thatcher of the United
Kingdom supported the boycott because she did not want the Soviet Union to use the Games for
propaganda.186 However, the United Kingdom’s Olympic federation voted to send a delegation
to the Olympics and domestic opinion was opposed to the boycott, so the United Kingdom
participated in the Games. Australia also supported the boycott, but later sent athletes.187 After
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some cajoling from both Carter and domestic opinion, West Germany supported the boycott and
chose not to send a delegation to the Olympics.188 The Netherlands both withdrew funding from
its Olympic athletes and refused to send a delegation to the Olympics.189
U.S. NATO Allies and Boycott Decision
Country

Boycott?

Belgium

No

Canada

Yes

Denmark

No

France

No

Iceland

No

Italy

No

Luxembourg

No

The Netherlands

Yes

Norway

Yes

Portugal

No

The United Kingdom

No

Greece

No

Turkey

Yes

West Germany

Yes

188
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Other allies, such as France, opposed to the boycott. Carter believed that the Olympic
boycott would be successful since 140 nations participated in the United Nations condemnation
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, these sentiments did not transpire to boycotting
the Moscow Olympics. Few nations responded to the White House invitation to hold an
alternative Olympics.190 Without the support of other countries and international federations, the
Carter administration’s efforts to host an alternative Olympics failed. Unlike the American
public, the international community showed demonstrably less support for the boycott.
WHY BOYCOTT?
Although the decision to boycott was nominally up to the USOC, President Carter was
the primary actor in deciding to boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. He unilaterally
announced the boycott during a Meet the Press Interview, in which he also warned Olympic
athletes not to try to attend on their own, and repeatedly reaffirmed the boycotting effort. Since
Carter made the decision, why did he decide to utilize a sporting boycott as a tool of foreignpolicy?
Sporting boycotts are an extension of sanctions, and governmental officials usually
employ sanctions when other efforts have failed. Although sanctions usually are not effective,
states still implement then as a symbolic measure, and such was the case with President Carter
and the 1980 Moscow Olympics. President Carter knew that military confrontation with the
Soviet Union was not an option. The United States military was not prepared for confrontation,
and the threat of a nuclear war further undermined such an approach. Thus, the administration’s
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remained limited to political and economic
actions, although economic options were limited since the two countries conducted very little
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trade with one another. The Carter administration had already implemented numerous sanctions
before President Carter’s Meet the Press interview. President Carter believed that these actions—
especially the grain embargo—would force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan,
evincing a fundamental misunderstanding of the Soviet Union.191 The grain embargo failed to
achieve its intended goal, so President Carter sought more punitive options. Boycotting the
Moscow Olympics was low cost, low risk, and high profile, but largely ineffective in coercing
the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan.
The Carter administration understood the importance of the Olympics to the Soviet
Union, stemming from the importance of honor in the Soviet culture. Honor for the Soviets
encompasses the ability to defend one’s home and avenge violations and is often associated with
nationalism.192 Historically, honor has been an integral part of Soviet society. Rooted in Eastern
Christianity, honor includes the ideal of a strong state with the ability to protect its subjects from
internal and external threats. During the Cold War, Soviet propaganda focused on honor, which
came to be presented as defending the socialist ideology in conjunction with power and
geopolitics.193
Moreover, for the Soviet Union, the Olympics symbolized an international recognition of
the legitimacy of the Soviet government. Moscow had submitted numerous bids to host the
Olympics, and the 1980 Summer Olympics was the first time the bid was accepted.194 Soviet
press covered the progression of the Olympic games during the upcoming months. Although
President Carter’s boycott was more symbolic than punitive, the Soviet deeply felt the impact on
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their honor and self-confidence. President Carter clearly understood that the boycott posed a
serious public challenge to Soviet prestige.
The boycott also stood for action. Often political leaders implement sanctions when no
other option is available to them. From this perspective, imposing sanctions are better than doing
nothing. Furthermore, sanctions send citizens a message of support, express concern, and relay
signals to the target state. Carter expressed such sentiments multiple times throughout the
boycott effort in public speeches, interviews, and in his writing. Carter argued that the U.S. could
not appear complacent in the face of Soviet aggression; attending the Olympics would be
conducting “business as usual.”195
Individuals can become bound to an unfavorable course of action by escalating their
commitment to an action. President Carter publicly committed to the boycott on Meet the Press.
After publicly announcing the one-month deadline on national television, Carter could not retract
the boycott because it would have questioned his credibility. President Carter cared deeply about
his credibility and his popularity among voters, particularly given the looming reelection
campaign. When public opinion turned against the boycott after the Winter Olympics, Carter
reaffirmed his intentions to boycott. Even if Carter later realized that implementing the boycott
could not achieve his intended goals, he was bound to continue the boycott because he had
publicly committed to the action.
Beyond President Carter, other individuals in the administration also contributed to the
decision to boycott. Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union as an adversary and viewed the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan as a threat to U.S. national security. Given the organization of Carter’s
advisory system, Brzezinski, who chaired the SCC, was able to impart his beliefs to President
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Carter multiple times during the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Cyrus Vance,
who exercised considerably less influence than Brzezinski, also helped to shape the boycott
policy.
Carter was cognizant of the public’s and Congress’s opinion during this time, and the
public initially supported the move to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Surveys conducted during
the initial stages of the boycott showed that public opinion favored the boycott. Media coverage
of the boycott also favored the boycott. Both the Senate and House of Representatives supported
the boycott. Even those who did not initially support the boycott—the State Department, the
United States Olympic Committee, and the International Olympic Committee—eventually
acquiesced to boycott the Moscow Olympics. Allies and other countries’ governmental officials
supported the boycott, albeit they did not always have the authority to ensure that its delegation
participated in the boycott. With public opinion, the media, and Congress supporting the boycott,
Carter had the domestic support to follow through with the decision.
President Carter and others within his administration knew that boycotting the Moscow
Olympics would not force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. President Carter and
Zbigniew Brzezinski both argued that the purpose of the boycott was to make the Soviet-Afghan
War as symbolically costly as possible for the Soviet Union. The Olympic boycott was aimed
against the Soviet Union’s prestige. Carter wanted to convey to the Soviet Union that the United
States did not approve of the invasion. Carter was aware that the Soviet Union would use the
Games for propaganda and had made significant investments to building facilities for the Games
and would ultimately use them to propagandize about Soviet superiority and American
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weakness.196 President Carter wanted to inflict the most harm possible upon the Soviet Union
without the risk of direct military conflict.
THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS BOYCOTT: IN ACTION AND THE AFTERMATH
Despite the U.S. absence from the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, the Games were
successful, especially for the Soviet Union. The Opening Ceremony of the 1980 Summer
Olympics in Moscow was exceptional. The Soviet Union exuded national pride through the
performances by dancers, musicians, and flags carriers.197 Most notably, a Soviet basketball
player climbed a human tower created by Soviet citizens in order to light the Olympic flame. 198
The stadium was at full capacity, and the Soviet Union earned a sizeable profit from hosting the
Games. Without participation from United States and Germany, the Soviet Union won 195
medals, 80 of which were gold.199 Looking beyond the performance of the Soviet Union, 36
world records were set.200 Given Soviet performance and the number of world records sets at the
Games, the Moscow Olympics were successful for the Soviet Union despite the Carter
administration’s effort to foil the event as punishment for the invasion of Afghanistan.
Scholars dispute the question of whether the Olympic boycott succeeded. In total, 80
countries attended the Moscow Olympics, compared to 92 countries participating in the 1976
Montreal Summer Olympics.201 Eighty countries participated in those Olympics.202 In addition,
other delegations competed independently, without a country affiliation. Records also show that
65 nations did not attend the Olympics. Not all nations, however, that did not attend did so in
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protest. Some nations simply lacked the resources to send athletes.203 Indeed, most of the
countries that chose to boycott were developing countries, whereas the Olympic movement was
more important to developed countries.204 These countries most likely were not coerced into
boycotting the Olympics, but wanted to gain favor with the U.S. According to Brzezinski, the
boycott was successful since the United States, China, Japan, and West Germany boycotted the
Moscow Olympics.205 However, China and Japan may have been important in world politics, but
not sports. Furthermore, China, threatened by the Soviet military presence in a bordering
country, boycotted not in response to U.S. pressure but for its own reason. According to U.S.
State Department’s records, all 65 absent nations were counted as boycotting states.206 The State
Department also alleged that the 65 nations that did not attend the Moscow Olympics won 71
percent of the medals in the last Summer Olympics in Montreal.207 According to Nicholas
Sarantakes’ assessment, the nations that attended the Moscow Olympics made up 70 percent of
the medals won at the 1976 Montreal Olympics.208 Clearly, scholars do not agree regarding the
overall effectiveness of the boycott. However, it must be noted that with the absence of athletes
from West Germany and the United States, the competition of the Moscow Olympics could not
be deemed as elite since a significant number of athletes were missing.
The Carter administration was not successful in forcing the Soviet Union out of
Afghanistan, but that was not the primary goal of the Olympic boycott. Soviet citizens exposed
to Western media were aware that the boycott was in response to international disapproval of

203

Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 226.
205
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, 434.
206
“The Olympic Boycott, 1980,” U.S. State Department Archives 2001-2009, accessed from https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm.
207
Nicholas Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 226.
208
Nicholas Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, 226.
204

51
their government.209 Brezhnev espoused that the boycott was an attempt to reignite Cold War
competition: “Not a day goes by when Washington has not tried to revive the spirit of the ‘Cold
War,’ to heat up militaristic passions. Any grounds are used for this, real or imagined. One
example of this is Afghanistan.”210 To General Secretary Brezhnev, the Carter administration
showed disrespect for important interstate exchanges by boycotting the Olympics.211 In the
Soviet press, journalists argued that if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not occurred, then
the Carter administration would have found another reason to boycott the Moscow Olympics.
The Soviet Union was cognizant of the absences of so many countries from the Olympics,
including the United States. Evincing the negative sentiments associated with the 1980 Moscow
Olympics, Soviet press stated that it was regrettable that the U.S. did not attend the Olympics,
but despite the Carter administration’s attempt to destroy the Olympics, the Soviet Union
prevailed.212 In 1984, the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries did not attend the
Los Angeles Olympics.213 Soviet officials claimed that Reagan administration would not provide
necessary security for Soviet athletes. However, many viewed the Soviet’s absence as simply a
pay-back from the U.S. 1980 boycott.
Although scholars agree that the Carter administration’s Olympic boycott did not force
the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan, some argue that the boycott succeeded symbolically.
President Carter conveyed clearly to the world U.S. disapproval of Soviet aggression against
Afghanistan. The Carter administration’s boycott punished and embarrassed the Soviet Union on
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a widely observed global stage. Moreover, given that more than 60 countries refused to attend
the Moscow Olympics, its success was enhanced. In addition, the absence of American and
German athletes undermined the value of the medals the Soviets claimed at the Games. The
Soviet Union flaunted the fact that it had dominated the Moscow Olympics, but its victories were
not viewed as fully legitimate. Four years later the Soviets retaliated by inflicting similar
embarrassment on the U.S. by refusing to attend the Los Angeles Olympics. Thus, the imposition
of a sporting boycott as a foreign-policy tool worked because the boycott did what it was
intended to do—embarrass the Soviet Union.
CONCLUSION
President Carter boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics to punish the Soviet Union for
invading Afghanistan. The leaders in his administration knew that utilizing the sporting boycott
as a foreign-policy tool would not force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. However, they still
chose to implement the Olympic boycott because it would challenge the Soviet Union’s prestige
in a very public setting.
Key figures in the Carter administration, including President Carter, National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, framed the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as a threat to the United States. Other actors such as Vice President Walter
Mondale, White House Special Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the United States Olympic Committee and
the International Olympic Committee, Congress, public opinion, the media, and the international
community influenced the decision to boycott and contributed to its implementation. The Carter
administration chose to enact a sporting boycott because past economic and diplomatic sanctions
failed as a means of inflicting harm on Moscow. Moreover, it wanted to embarrass and diminish
the Soviet Union, which was hosting the Olympic Games at the time. By refusing to attend and
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convincing other countries to stay home, the U.S. effectively undermined the quality of the
Moscow Games and undermined the legitimacy and value of Soviet Olympic victories.
Sports and politics are often deeply intertwined. This connection is especially apparent
during international sporting competitions such as the Olympics. The increasingly overt
connection between sports and politics has prompted some scholars to deem the use of
diplomacy or other foreign-policy tools in influencing sporting competitions as sports diplomacy.
Sports diplomacy can be utilized to improve or strengthen friendly relations or to inflict
punishment, shame, or embarrassment. In the case of the 1980 Olympic boycott, President
Carter’s use of sports diplomacy sought to punish and embarrass the Soviet Union on a very
global stage.
Historically, scholars such as Robert Pape, Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef Sprinz
have argued that sanctions are not effective in coercing a state to alter its behavior. Their theory
certainly holds true in this case. But the goal of the Carter administration reached beyond forcing
Soviet withdrawal. This boycott provides an example of a country using soft power as a
mechanism for exposing, reprimanding, and punishing a recalcitrant regime. This outcome,
while difficult to measure, fulfilled its objective. Given the circumstances and the constraints on
available tools, the Carter administration chose the right tool and wielded it effectively.
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